August 8, 1914
On the ground, the Liège operation seemed to be falling into place. The 21-centimeter mortars from the Twenty-Seventh and Fourteenth Brigades together shelled Fort Barchon. The guns of the forts, all of mid-1880s vintage, were flat-trajectory weapons. The Germans brought thirty-two 21‑centimeter mortars, four battalions, a generation newer and far more accurate than the weapons Liège was originally designed to face.Sixteenth Infantry Regiment received the order to storm Fort Barchon. And by 1700 a summons to surrender was successful. An investigation after the war concluded that Fort Barchon could have held out much longer and that a German infantry assault was not possible. The German intelligence estimate speculated the BEF might be located as far forward as Brussels! When Second Army HQ arrived west of Aachen, the situation was believed to be critical. Telephonic communication was established with the liaison officer.There was still no communication with Emmich, but Second Army HQ did learn that Fort Fléron was still in enemy hands. During its move, Second Army HQ did not have a radio station and thus was without connection to the outside world. What were passed to the commander were rumors and not even verifiable random news. These said that not only had none of the other assault brigades advanced, but the Thirty-Fourth Infantry Brigade that was supposed to lead the decisive strike west of the River Meuse had been almost annihilated. Furthermore, not even one fortress had been taken.
On the morning of August 8, Ludendorff reported in person to the commander of Second Army. He had not been able to get inside any of the fortifications. He reported that all communication with General von Emmich had been severed and assumed that the Belgians, along with some help from the French, had reoccupied the forts and that the Germans had been forced to retreat. This nourished a fear in the German command that the guns of the forts commanded every road leading to the city. An overwhelming assumption seems to have developed at Second Army’s HQthat the Belgians had defeated the German troops in Liège. The three brigades still outside Liège were of little help in clarifying the situation inside the city. The High Command was also trying to direct the operation bypassing Second Army HQ. Bülow, suffering the agonies of apprehension, understood that the prestige of the German Army and the future of his own career depended upon the fate of the brigades trapped inside Liège and on his ability to make good the victory that had already been announced. Twenty-four hours passed without any significant change in the situation, while every effort to reach Emmich failed.
Astonished and disappointed, Bülow initiated another improvised fallback plan. This one consisted essentially of bringing up super-heavy artillery and smashing the belligerent Belgian fortresses into submission. He also complicated the chain of command even more. With Emmich out of contact, Bülow created yet another level that would be responsible for all forces in the siege of Liège. The position of the reinforcement commander, the commanding general of Seventh Army Corps. Much like Emmich,. Gen. der Kavallerie Karl von Einem now occupied a an ad hoc position between Emmich and Bülow in Second Army. Both Einem and Emmich were army corps commanders. He was now in charge of elements of four different army corps, Unlike the misbegotten command of Emmich, Einem’s was a corps HQ responsiblefor several separate brigades from different army corps, plus an HKK deficient in communication troops and staff. but it is not clear exactly what his orders were. Einem’s command was put together by fiat and expected to perform effectively. Moreover, rather than enable Einem’s use of the staff and communication capabilities of Second Army, Bülow avoided blame by making coordination Einem’s responsibility; a probable case of plausible deniability. Thirty-Fourth Brigade would continue to hold near Visé in the north, while Twenty-Eighth Brigade was to move toward Fort Fléron and d’Evegnée. On its left, Thirty-Eighth Brigade would secure to the north of Fraipont on the Vesdre and Forty-Third Brigade to the south of it. To their rear, Fortieth Brigade of Tenth Corps was to move on Pepinster. Ninth Army Corps would unload at Aachen, Seventh at Eupen, and Tenth at Malmedy, then all advance to Einem’s support.
Meanwhile German consolidation within Liège. As described earlier, Fort Barchon fell to the fire of six 21-centimeter mortars. It was 21-centimeter mortars that were solely responsible for the surrender of nine of the twelve Liège forts. Almost any history concerning Liège credits the 42-centimeter super-heavy German guns (also known as Dicke Berthas) in reducing the fortresses, but this was basically untrue. The Krupp monsters were not yet ready when war broke out. The chief technical difficulty to be overcome was how to make the guns mobile. The original 1909 model had to be transported by rail and, due to its powerful recoil, embedded in concrete before it was fired. A road model was tested in February 1914 and the Krupp plant managed to convert two Dicke Berthasinto road-transportable models, but the howitzers would not be ready until August 10.
The pontoon bridge across the Meuse at Lixhe was completed on August 8. The cavalry not only crossed the river, but also set up bivouac positions near Looz and Cortessem. Pausing at these locations, the cavalry divisions were able to consolidate their forces and limited heavy equipment while continuing to patrol forward. The patrols reported that no enemy forces were approaching Liège either from the northwest or from the west. The situation in the south, from where French troops were allegedly approaching, was still unclear. Consequently, Emmich bypassed the HKK 2 commander and ordered Ninth Cavalry Division to do everything in order to determine the strength and the marching route of the French and to hold them up if possible. This took the division far away from its original mission west of the River Meuse—where it was urgently needed to provide reconnaissance for the main advance. On the positive side, the Stavelot Tunnel was entirely repaired and the first German train could use that line of track.
At this point in time, memoirs started complaining about the force structure of the cavalry divisions. Remember that Moltke fixed the strength of the army cavalry on the decisive wing at three, instead of the originally projected five to eight, cavalry divisions. Because Ninth Cavalry Division had been unexpectedly assigneda different task in the south by General von Emmich, Second and Fourth Cavalry Divisions had to perform the reconnaissance unaided on an excessively extended front. Over the next week, the structural issue of failing to integrate cavalry and aviation reconnaissance came to a sore point. HKK 2 was trying to provide information to those formations advancing behind it, but strongly lamented the lack of aviation. The attention of aerial reconnaissance focused increasingly to the southwest against possible French or Belgian relief attempts from the direction of Namur and Dinant. As it turned out, there was no indication of such an operation. An FFA 9 airplane managed to land on the Liège airfield and establish liaison with the troops inside the fortress.
A day of rest due to the horses being overfatigued was ordered for HKK 1(Richthofen). The Guard Division’s report reads:
March from Bitburg in the Eiffel to Diekirch was very exhausting on account of the steep mountains, new to horses. Roads were spoiled by every rain. Our two sick regiments with influenza were badly exhausted. The artillery was in a bad way. Its light munitions columns had been equipped with poor horses, mainly coldbloods unaccustomed to rapid traveling. Four horses were dead of overstrain and many more scarcely were able to move. One-third of the animals had their hind hoofs unshod by delay delivery of horseshoes, so that many wore out.