August 22, 1914
All four First Army active corps were able to move on two roads each, or with one division on every route of advance. This meant a reducing of the length of each corps column. Rather than a single route that took over thirty kilometers, now the divisional routes could be taken each at fifteen kilometers. Not only would road space decrease, but the ability to make adjustments laterally increased a great deal with the additional roads. Marching separately and fighting concentrated took on a whole new look. This would also speed up movement as congestion would be reduced. Given the availability of routes, Fifth Squadron Thirteenth Uhlans reached the French frontier south of the line Wiers–Peruwelz–Bernissart at noon all.A good twenty kilometers west of Mons, this shows that the cavalry of HKK 2 were well in position to do a wide-enveloping action should an opponent appear in the area of Mons.
Second Cavalry Division was again attached to HKK 2and had moved north around Brussels. Fourth and Ninth Division moved around Namur, and the three united on August 22 near Ath. The advance west continued. Once again, the theory was to cover the three different approaches that the BEF could take. The HKK 2 would perform reconnaissance to the west as well as cover the expected concentration area of Lille. The HKK 1 was supposed to cover the Maubeuge concentration area. This last expectation was a bit too optimistic. Guard Cavalry Division, after diverting around Namur, arrived at Gembloux with Fifth Cavalry Division far behind. Due to severe road congestion around Namur and behind Second Army, HKK 1 did not believe it had completed the move to the right of Second Army until August 28. As a result, there would be significant gaps in the reconnaissance that HKK1 was expected to conduct in the area around Maubeuge.As of yet, the Germans had no clear intelligence picture of the location of the BEF. For their part, the French became aware of this mass of cavalry but overestimated its strength to be about five divisions. The British were also acutely aware of the potential threat to their open left flank. Haig lamented, “We approach a difficult terrain, a swampy valley. The enemy could stop us with a few forces and with reasonable acceleration surround our left flank by massive troops without the possibility to resist, as far as I know. The approach is aimed on the left flank of the allied armies. The British forces are in a most desperate position.”
The prevailing prewar German hypothesis was that BEF would concentrate around Lille. While that would make them operationally separate from the French Army, this was the overwhelming belief at the OHL still. There was a chance that the BEF might come from the channel ports directly. This possibility caused Kluck to deploy his army with a refused right flank in echelon. There was also a chance that they may come from the south in the vicinity of Maubeuge. Focusing on the Lille expectation, all of the aviation assets of First Army were sent in that direction. The one exception was the flying section of Ninth Army Corps. That unit, FFA 11, was assigned to the area around Mons. All of these aviation elements reported negative contact with the BEF. This included a negative report from FFA 11. The morning report stated, “No military activity in this sector of Mons.” Therefore, the staff of First Army still thought the BEF was well south of Mons if located in that direction.
At 1030 hours, Ninth Cavalry Division was informed that a squadron of Eighth Hussar Regiment, as well as a patrol from Fourth Kürassier Regiment, had found British cavalry in the town of Casteau. The village is located between the towns of Mons and Soignies on the road Mons–Brussels. This was immediately reported to First Army.
Then one of the classic moments of fog and friction struck. Around 1500 hours, one of the aircraft from Ninth Army Corps definitively found the BEF. The aircraft reported large bodies of troops moving to Bavai and from Bavai to Binche. In addition, the aviators found vehicles and wagons on the road from Valencies to Mons. This very important aviation report was not, however, forwarded to First Army. Why? The intelligence sections officer (Ic) of the German army corps left a great deal to be desired. They were heavily overworked and did not forward an estimated fifty percent of the aviation reports to First Army. The aviation reports were frequently bundled at the end of the day. Telephonic contact was sporadic at best. The lack of a dedicated aviation staff officer at the army level meant that the aviation reports had to be handled by another staff officer who was already overburdened with his traditional tasks. This extremely important report “fell through the cracks.”
Reports started coming in by radio. Remember that only the cavalry divisions had radios and they could only report to the numbered army HQ. These broadcasts were available to any receiver and were allegedly broadcast in the clear. It is not certain who the source was on this 1100-hours transmission. “Patrol taken under fire on the canal six kilometers east of Mons. Roeulx—northeast of Mons—clear. Area clear as far as Escot.” Now this might seem simple enough but it raises quite a few questions. What exactly is meant by Roeulx? There is such a location but it is named La Roeulx. There is another location with just the name Roeulx in the opposite direction, five kilometers southwest of Denain. What is meant by Escot? It is a normal French term used in place of the Scheldt River. It is also an old region of northern France, as well as a village name. All of them are on the west side of the battle zone.
Almost an hour later, at 1150 hours, Fourth Cavalry Division radioed a message: “Patrol of Fourth Cavalry has positively identified an English squadron at Casteau northeast of Mons.” Ninth Army Corps sent in a report that arrived at 1500 hours: “According to the declaration of inhabitants, Mons is occupied by English troops.” In addition, Fourth Cavalry Division continued to transmit, this time at 1640 hours: “English at Maubeuge.” This report was supplemented late in the evening, at 2150 hours: “Passages of the Canal du Centre between Nimy and Ville-sur-Haine are occupied by the British.” An aviation report reached First Army at 2145 hours: “No sort of military activity in the sector St. Ghislain–Mons.” Other negative reports indicated that the areas Audenarde–Remaix–Grammont, as well as the area Ath–Tournai, were free of enemy troops and that the railroad lines around Lille were quiet.Note the late hour of the aviation reports. This clearly explains the length of time it took to get a report from the airfield up to First Army. Also, a key to the timing is that First Army issued the order for August 23 at 2130 hours, reports of contact postdated the issuance of the order. Third Army Corps shot down a British aircraft. Interrogation of the captured pilot revealed that he was coming from Maubeuge. That gave more credence to the BEF being located in the south.An excerpt from the Army Order of August 22 states, “A squadron of British cavalry was encountered today at Casteau, northeast of Mons, and a British airplane coming from Maubeuge was shot down near Enghien. In front of Second Army there appear today to be only three British cavalry divisions and a weak force of infantry.” Clearly, Kluck did not know the strength of the forces in front of him. The subordinate units were told that a British cavalry screen had been encountered. But the Germans at First Army HQ did not know the strength or the exact location of the main body. They did not know how deep the BEF was deployed or how far away. Ninth Army Corps had a better idea about the BEF and that it was five kilometers away, but not its controlling HQ. A quote from Kuhl’s diary confirmed that he thought only cavalry were front of him: “There remains doubt as to what is going on from the English, whether strong forces are there and where.”
“The English” were suddenly opposite First Army. The German First Army knew they had found the British but did not know exactly their strength. The assessment of the First Army staff was that the BEF were in the region between Valenciennes and Maubeuge and perhaps even further back. The British intent was interpreted to be coming up on the French left hand and not by way of Lille–Tournai. This analysis supported the view of a wide-enveloping move and that the order issued by Bülow on the twenty-first ordering First Army to invest Maubeuge did not conform or take advantage of the current situation. Lieutenant Colonel Tappen of the OHL, through a series of relays with corresponding chances of errors, approved the instructions to Second Army and directed First Army to stay in strict liaison with Second Army, directing that the sweeping movement be delayed until the enemy had been beaten. First Army appealed directly to Second Army to no avail. General von Lauenstein did not approve the sweeping proposal but did decide to reduce the force required to invest Maubeuge to a single division.
That night, however, a messenger reached the reconnaissance squadron in the woods northeast of Wadelincourtwith the information that the patrols had drawn heavy fire at the outskirts of Condé. The squadron therefore moved on Condé very early on August 23. Its reconnaissance revealed that the vicinity and woods north of Condé were held by French territorial infantry, middle-aged and poorly trained reservists. The enemy was purely on the defensive; there was no reconnoitering cavalry. Simultaneously, it was learned that the Scheldt [River] crossings as far as Tournai likewise were occupied by the enemy. The identification of French territorials at Condé was very important information. Territorial troops had never been used previously in the first line of defense. The Germans had identified the eastern flank of the British near Binche and now, with the discovery of French territorials at Condé, the Germans understood that all British forces should be to the east of this point. The extent of the British zone of operations was established because it was also known that a group of French regular army units constituting the left flank of the French Army was concentrated at Charleroi. The British cavalry, after being relieved by infantry, joined the left flank of the British Army, covering the canal crossings as far as Condé.