August 6,1914 Luftschiff ZVI supported of the ground forces. By 0300 hours on August 6, it was over Liège. There, the crew dropped a load of 15- and 21-centimeter shells onto the Belgian fortifications. However, artillery fire struck the airship, and she began losing gas. She eventually made a forced landing in a forest at Walberburg. Damaged beyond repair, the crash eliminated the Army of the Meuse’s lighter-than-air capability. This element conducted no long-range reconnaissance, and now that entire capability was completely and drastically removed. FFA 9 was not tasked for any missions.
The Belgians destroyed the central Liège bridges of Maghin and Arches at 1105 hours and 1130 hours, respectively. By now the Belgian Army was in position, with four divisions behind the Gette, one division at Namur, and one division at Liège for a total of about 117,000 troops. The Army regarded itself as the vanguard of its French, and now British, allies. “Here the Belgian Army was to wait until the military forces of the guaranteeing powers occupied the intermediate space between the Gette and Namur. . . . At the same time, liaison could be maintained with the base of operations, Antwerp, from which in no circumstances should the Army let itself be cut off.”
An unheralded combat occurred near the Belgian market town of Waremme and led the Belgians to capture many prisoners. This action significantly affected the forces available for the two German regiments involved—Fourth German Cavalry Division lost the equivalent of half of a cavalry regiment out of only six. The German official history was silent on this matter, as was Poseck.Like the later battle of Halen, almost all sources ignore the events at Waremme.
Four reconnaissance squadrons went forward on August 5.Two of these were lost at Waremme. By later standards, these losses would be insignificant. Two small counters were removed from the map just two days after the start of the war. Considering that cavalry allocationhad been weak from the start, the Germans could ill afford the loss of these two squadronsfor no reason or gain.
The 34th brigade reached Hermée at midnight. and went directly into contact with Fort Pontisse. A battalion flag from Eighty-Ninth Infantry Regiment was buried to save it from capture. More alarming, it was reported that the brigade commander gathered the field grade officers at the village of Hermée and gave them their orders for the first time. Allegedly, the officers were not aware their objective was the Citadel in Liège until that early hour. If the report were true, there must have been a little doubt that during a few hours at night the regiments could find their way over the large amounts of ground required to reach their assigned objectives. Once again, it seems as if the progress arrows shown in the official Handstreichhistory were pure fiction. “Still at dark the infantry storm troops advanced without any artillery support with unloaded guns and fixed bayonets, among them many recruits who never experienced a night battle. The thrust was carried out from an unfavorable direction toward an invisible enemy and unknown obstacles.”
Seventh Jäger Battalion moved along the road and slipped into a gap between Forts Pontisse and Liers, as imagined in the original plan. Without making any contact whatsoever, the battalion had broken through and was behind Belgian lines. At dawn, Seventh Jäger reached the Quartier du Nord in Liège—and stopped.The battalionarrived unaware in front of the house of the Military Commander of Liège, General Leman. Leman and his staff were completely surprised. Leman evacuated, but this led to a collapse of the Belgian command-and-control system at a critical time.Out of contact with the rest of the brigade, Seventh Jäger commander decided to withdraw. By 0900 hours, the return march began. Patrols, however, returned reporting they had not made contact with the brigade. That information led the Seventh to believe that the brigade indeed had occupied Liège without the Seventh’s presence. Disconcerted at least, probably embarrassed,he decided to turn back to Liège at 1600 hours. Before getting very far, however, the bulk of the battalion, exhausted, unfed, and disoriented, was either captured or scattered. At the end of the day, Seventh Jäger Battalion could only muster fewer than two companies.
As for the rest of the brigade, the Eighty-Ninth and Ninetieth Infantry Regiments, receiving fire from Forts Pontisse and Liers, arrived at a railroad embankment. The shaft of the Ninetieth Infantry Regiment’s standard was leaned against the slope as a marker and a challenge;the men climbed up the two- to three-meter high embankment. Eventually, the attack stalled three hundred meters from Fort Liers. The commander’s conclusion was that it could not continue without artillery support and, of course, that artillery could not cross the river. By dawn, Thirty-Fourth Infantry Brigade was scattered haphazardly across the terrain behind Fort Liers and Fort Pontisse. About six hundred soldiers from different units were east of Rhées. The Ninetieth regimental commander ordered a withdrawal to Hermée at about 1030 hours. The brigade commander followed suit at 1045 hours. As HKK 2 prepared to move, their way was blocked by the retreating brigade. Finally, a desperate request for help arrived at HKK 2 “in order to save the brigade from total destruction.”In the evening, the rest of the brigade was withdrawn over the Meuse River to bivouac east of Mouland.
In 27thInfantry Brigade’s zone of advance, a thunderstorm developed. In the darkness, the assigned guide from the general staff concluded a breakthrough was not possible. The commander of the leading regiment, the Sixteenth Infantry, therefore decided only to demonstrate in front of the forts. Sixteenth Infantry Regiment withdrew all the way back to Battice. At dawn, Twenty-Fifth Infantry Regiment launched a bayonet attack just west of Fort Barchon. Although not mentioned in the history, most of the commissioned and noncommissioned leaders and many soldiers were killed or wounded in a charge that certainly resonates of a traditional bayonet charge.
General Ludendorff, accompanying the rear of the 14th Infantry Brigade’s column, pushed forward. Ludendorff was quite visible while leading some of the artillery into position. The cooperation of the infantry and artillery and the personal leadership exerted on the spot enabled the Germans to capture Queue-du-Bois by about 0630 hours. Fourteenth Infantry Brigade was to pass successfully between the two forts and, by daylight on August 6, held positions on the high ground sloping down toward Liège.
By 0630 hours, the Belgians were retreating through Bellaire all the way to Jupille. The Germans in pursuit entered Bellaire at about 0730 hours. Leman had already committed all his reserves to Sart-Tilman. When Leman heard the Germans were at Queue-du-Bois, he immediately ordered the Belgian troops in the sector to withdraw. This withdrawal threatened the rear of the Belgian troops at Sart-Tilman, who also were forced to withdraw. At 0930 hours, the troops at Jupille received the order for the general withdrawal of the Belgian Third Infantry Division. At 1100 hours, German Twenty-Seventh Infantry Regiment took control of Jupille. Obviously, this part of the Handstreichhad worked. The brigade was beyond the forts and overlooking Liège. Patrols were sent out to find the neighboring brigades, but Eleventh Infantry Brigade was not at Beyne-Heusay, nor Twenty-Seventh Infantry Brigade at Wandre. Similarly, at 2200 hours, two Jäger companies were sent to secure four of the bridges, but Belgian engineers had destroyed the bridge at Pont du Arches to halt the German advance.
The commander 11th Infantry Brigade, finally restored order by daylight. At this point, Eleventh Infantry Brigade had broken through Fléron and Chaudefontaine and was behind the line of forts, but troops had to maneuver to avoid artillery fire from those forts. By 1400 hours, elements of Thirty-Fifth Infantry Regiment entered Beyne-Heusay. The troops were by then exhausted, and the brigade faced the built-up area east of Liège; fighting would be street to street and house to house. The commander therefore withdrew the brigade to bivouac west of Magnée.
