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Dec 20: Everything that shoots Is being used: employment of captured MGs

The Captured Machine Gun Manual

Captured machine guns became so important to the German war effort that these weapons, where possible, were modified to use German ammunition, and German industry even produced some spare parts for them. In 1916 the scope of this work reached such an extent that a separate manual titled “Captured Weapons” was produced, covering these types. In the form of a catalogue, it listed the German designations for spare parts, which were to be ordered from the Rifle Examining Commission via the supply route. This chapter’s organization reflects that of the manual and it is subdivided into Russian, French and British machine guns.

The Russian Maxim Machine Gun, Modified for S Ammunition

The Tsarist Army received its first Maxim machine guns from DWM production in 1899. They were the DWM Model 1894 with the heavy bronze jacket, but in 7.62 x 54 R caliber, the famous Russian three-line caliber. License production of the Maxim began in the federal arsenal in Tula in 1905. In 1910 the bronze jacket was replaced by the distinctive fluted steel jacket and standardized as the Pulemet Maxima obr. 1910g (Russian designation). In the German Captured Weapons manual these two models are designated Modell alter Art, or old type (Model 1905 with bronze jacket) and Modell neuer Art, or new type (Model 1910 with grooved steel jacket).

The new mounting of the machine gun was also characteristic. The weapon rested on a cradle with two small spoked wheels and a U-shaped handle for pulling, named after its designer Colonel Sokolov. There was also an older tripod carriage, likewise with two wheels but with a trail and two hemp rope grips. Protective shields could be fitted to both carriages. Goldsmith estimates that about 38,000 Maxim guns were produced in Russia by 1918. A considerable percentage of these were captured by German troops. As the structure of the Russian Maxim was similar to that of the German machine gun, converting it was quite simple. The Russian recoil booster was adopted. The muzzle gland, which gave the barrel bearing and guidance, was eliminated. The recoil booster was threaded at the front, and this was screwed into the recoil plug. This had a hole in front with different diameters above and below. When the bullet passed the hole, for an instant it was sealed. This prevented the powder gases from flowing out and they now pressed against the muzzle of the barrel. This accelerated the sliding back of the barrel and increased rate of fire. The Russian machine gun barrel’s muzzle was reinforced, offering the pressure of the gas great scope. The German machine gun barrel was significantly thinner, therefore two collars were fitted, the base bushing and guide bushing, which held the barrel in the jacket head. The base bushing was extended rearwards and facilitated insertion of the barrel. Lock, bolt base and crank handle were replaced with German parts. A final change affected the belt feed mechanism. Its front wall had to be filed because of the longer German ammunition. The cartridge guide spring on the front inside of the German feed mechanism could not be installed in the Russian feed mechanism due to lack of space. Also changed was the sight (German pillar-type rear sight) and the spring device indicator. The weapon was then marked with an “S” (modified for the 8 mm x 57 IS cartridge) in white on the receiver cover, and occasionally there was also a brass “S” riveted in place. Thus modified, the Russian Maxim, in the opinion of the GPK, was equal to the German MG 08.

French Machine Guns

La mitrailleuse de la victoire, the Hotchkiss Models 1897, 1900 and 1914

France bet on air cooling and blowback operation for its heavy machine guns. Their starting point was a patent by Hauptmann Adolf Odkolek von Augezt of the Austro-Hungarian Army. The French firm Société de la Fabrication des Armes à Feu Portatives Hotchkiss & Cie, founded by the American Benjamin Hotchkiss, procured the rights to the design, and another American, Laurence Benet, made it ready for production as the Hotchkiss Model 1897. As a gas-operated open-bolt design, the weapon was positive-locking. That meant that an external influence was needed to unlock it. Powder gases were tapped from a hole drilled in the barrel and directed to the breechblock by way of a piston. The lock unlocked and moved back, extracting the fired cartridge from the chamber. A closing spring moved the lock forward again, at the same time loading the next cartridge into the chamber. The lock then locked positively again until the next gas impulse. On the Model 1897, cooling of the heavy barrel was achieved by large steel fins, which on the Model 1900 were replaced by brass fins, which increased surface area and improved heat dissipation. The ammunition feed system was a weak point. The machine gun used flat, thin metal loading strips. Open at the top, each held 30 Lebel 8-mm cartridges (8 mm x 50 R). They were pulled through the system from the left by a gear wheel and two bevelled cams on the gas piston. The empty cartridge cases fell out of the weapon on the other side. Dirt was thus automatically carried into the weapon and led to stoppages. Especially noteworthy was the fact that the original weapon consisted of just 38 parts (compared to the roughly 250 parts of the MG 08). The machine gun had just four springs, not a single screw and apart from the barrel and gas cylinder could be disassembled without tools. Dispensing with the complex liquid cooling system did not make the Hotchkiss a lightweight, however. Without carriage the Hotchkiss weighed 25 kg (compared to the 23.5 kg of the MG 08), to which was added the 33 kg of the tripod mount (MG 08 sledge, 37 kg). If the tripod was set at the lowest firing height, the gunner was forced to crouch behind the weapon semi-upright. Prior to the First World War, France procured only a few Hotchkiss Model 1900s and placed them in fortresses. In 1914 the French Army went to war with a development of its own, the St. Étienne M 1907 machine gun. Not until November 1914 was the Hotchkiss Model 1900, then called the Model 1914, procured in large numbers and from 1916 it replaced the St. Étienne M 1907.

Altogether, 47,000 examples were produced from 1914 to 1918, thus making it the most important French machine gun, the mitrailleuse de la victoire. As a captured machine gun the Hotchkiss Model 1914 was also so significant that in addition to being listed in the Captured Weapons manual it received its own manual of operation. As conversion of the weapon to German ammunition was technically not possible, it was increasingly assigned to rear-echelon formations, where it was used by security units and for anti-aircraft defence.

Hotchkiss Machine Gun Specification

Manufacturer:             Société de la Fabrication des Armes à Feu Portatives Hotchkiss & Cie

Operating principle:    Open-bolt gas pressure loader with support bar for continuous fire only. Air-cooled barrel.

Caliber:                       8 mm Lebel (8 mm x 50 R)

Length:                        1,307 mm

Weapon weight:          25 kg

Tripod mount weight: 33 kg

Ammunition feed:       Loading strip for 30 rounds fed from the left

Rate of fire:                 450 rounds per minute (theoretical)

The St. Étienne Machine Gun Model 1907

Probably for political reasons, it was not possible to introduce the Hotchkiss machine gun prior to 1914. The product of a private company, founded by an American, based on a patent by an officer of the Austro-Hungarian Army, was probably a little too much “internationalism” for the Grande Nation—in fact, France traditionally purchased only French weapons.

In 1900, therefore, French officers began working on their own design for a machine gun which had nothing to do with the original Hotchkiss design. A first attempt from the arsenal in Puteaux in 1905 was unconvincing. After two years the Puteaux Model 1905 disappeared into reserve units and fortresses. The design was reworked in the federal arsenal at St. Étienne, but this failed to produce any decisive improvements. Like the competing design from Hotchkiss, the St. Étienne was a gas-operated weapon, however the gas piston with a rack installed at the rear was driven forward. The transfer of force to the breechblock was achieved awkwardly by way of a gear wheel. The closing spring was largely open under the barrel and as a result was subject to dirt accumulation. A delay device taken from the initial Puteaux model made it possible to adjust the gun’s rate of fire between 8 and 500 rounds per minute. This installation further complicated the weapon, which was already sensitive to dirt and unreliable. These problems were aggravated by poor-quality materials made from brittle wartime metal. The machine gun was fed by loading strips inserted from the left, each holding 25 cartridges. These were slightly curved, another source of trouble. Despite all these problems, 41,000 examples of this weapon were produced (30,000 at St. Étienne and 11,000 at Châtellerault). Once again, conversion to German ammunition was impossible. The gun was used in similar fashion to the Hotchkiss.

St. Étienne Machine Gun Model 1907 Specification

Manufacturer: federal arsenals in St. Étienne and Châtellerault

Operating principle: Gas-operated, air cooled

Caliber: 8 mm Lebel (8 mm x 50 R)

Length: 1,180 mm

Weapon weight: 26 kg

Carriage weight: 33 kg

Ammunition feed: loading strips, each with 24 cartridges

Fusil Mitrailleur Modèle 1915, Chauchat, ShoSho or the Worst Machine Gun of the War?

In addition to heavy machine guns, France also needed lighter, more mobile automatic weapons for trench warfare. As efforts to convert the Lewis machine gun to the French Lebel 8-mm cartridge failed, in a situation of want they fell back on a design by French Colonel Henri Chauchat and machinist Henri Sutter. To meet the French Army’s urgent need, on April 28, 1915 French Commander-in-Chief General Joffre ordered the immediate production of 50,000 Chauchat-Sutter machine guns, even before service trials had been carried out. The Société des Cycles Clement et Gladiator, a manufacturer of bicycles in Paris, was given the job of producing the machine guns. To achieve the ambitious production targets, Chauchat, Sutter and the technical director of the Paul Ribeyrolles bicycle factory tried to simplify the weapon and prepare it for mass production by the spring of 1916. The machine gun, dubbed Fusil Mitrailleur 1915, underwent its baptism of fire at Verdun in March 1916. 26,000 examples were completed by September 1916. By the time the war ended, Gladiator and another company, the Forges et Aeriéres de la Marine à Homecourt in St. Charnoud, had completed 270,000 weapons of the FM 1915 type. The Chauchat thus became the most produced automatic weapon of the First World War. In designing the weapon, Chauchat and Summer took as their example John M. Browning’s patent for “long barrel recoil”. The bolt parts do not separate from the barrel until after it has completed its rearward movement. Extraction and ejection of the empties takes place when the barrel returns forward, while the bolt is retained in the rear position. The weapon could be set to single-fire, burst or continuous fire modes. There were problems during continuous fire and longer bursts. The weapon overheated and then had to cool for a prolonged period. The French training manual therefore envisaged that the Chauchat would mainly be fired in single-shot mode. Another weakness was the crescent-shaped magazine, whose design was owed to the 8-mm rimmed Lebel cartridge. The magazine was made of thin metal and bent easily. Two large openings on the right side allowed dirt and moisture to enter the magazine, which could lead to stoppages. As well, the magazine spring was too weakly designed. Aiming with the Chauchat also demanded a certain degree of acrobatics. The long barrel recoil meant that the jacket screw plug reached almost to the end of the stock. The gunner therefore had to position himself so that his head was forward of the screw plug. Otherwise there were facial injuries, the feared “slap in the face”. The sight was also offset to the left, in the direction of fire. Despite all these shortcomings the Chauchat had the advantage that it was available in large numbers. In autumn 1917 every French infantry company had twelve Chauchats and thus enormous firepower at a time when the German Army was just beginning to introduce the MG 08/15. The FM 1915 undeservedly gained its reputation as the “worst machine gun of the war” from the American Army. Envisaged as stopgap equipment for the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) until introduction of the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR), it did not live up to the expectations of the American soldiers. Then the conversion of the Chauchat to the Springfield 30.06 caliber, designated the Model 1918, with its wrongly-bored chamber, completely ruined its reputation.

Although it was included in the Captured Machine Guns Manual, it is doubtful if the Chauchat saw service with the German Army in large numbers.

Chauchat Machine Gun Specification

Manufacturer: Société des Cycles Clement et Gladiator, Paris and Forges et Alciéries de la Marine à Homecourt in St. Chamond

Operating principle : Long barrel recoil with gas assist. Air-cooled barrel. Arranged for single fire, bursts and continuous fire (switchable)

Caliber: 8 mm Lebel (8 mm x 50 R)

Length: 1,140 mm

Weight: 9.2 kg (unloaded)

Ammunition feed: Crescent-shaped magazine for 20 rounds

Mount: Bipod

Rate of fire: 240 rounds (theoretical)

British Machine Guns

Vickers Machine Gun

In August 1914 the six infantry divisions of the British Expeditionary Force were essentially still equipped with 100 Maxim Mark I and Mark II machine guns. The captured enemy machine guns manual referred to these machine guns as “englische M.G. alter Art” (English MG Old Type) and “englische M.G. neuer Art” (English MG New Type) and noted that spare parts for these machine guns were not available and that a “more detailed description of these machine guns has been omitted from this book”. The succeeding version, the Vickers Class C, had been formally adopted in November 1912, but it was not until January 1915 that it began reaching the troops in quantity. From that time, it too was captured in large numbers and in the German nomenclature was designated the Vickers-MG (Maximmodell neuer Art). The principle differences compared to the Maxim design were:

• The Vickers was significantly lighter than its predecessors. The weapon itself with cooling water weighed 18.1 kg.
• The machine gun had no ejector tube. The empty casings fell out the bottom of the receiver.
• The lock was inverted, causing the toggle to break upwards.
• The trigger bar was housed in the receiver cover.
• The trigger therefore pointed upward.
• The extractor was held in place by a special flap.
• The crank handle was quickly replaceable, as it was attached in the manner of a bayonet clip.
• In the rest position the crank handle was forward. Movement of the cocking handle during cocking and firing therefore took place in reverse fashion.
• The open receiver bottom could be closed by means of a slider to prevent dirt from entering and fouling the lock parts.

The gun was otherwise served and disassembled in similar fashion to the German MG 08. Modification of the gun to use German ammunition was also not particularly difficult. The parts to be changed were listed on Page 77 of the Captured Machine Guns Manual. They included:

• Rear sight pillar with scale, slider and screw
• Feed mechanism cover
• Belt feed levers left and right
• Belt lever
• Extractor
• Cartridge holder
• Fusee spring cover
• Barrel
• Gland
• Barrel pointer

The Vickers was a popular and well-liked machine gun, which was also lighter than its German contemporary.

Vickers Machine Gun Mark I Specification

Manufacturer: Vickers Ltd.

Operating principle: Recoil-loader with short barrel recoil and toggle bolt

Caliber: Originally British .303 adapted to 8 mm x 57 IS (S cartridge)

Length: 1,120 mm

Weapon weight: 18.1 kg with cooling water

Carriage weight: 13.6 kg

Ammunition feed: Linen belt 250 rounds

Rate of fire: 450 rounds per minute (theoretically 600 rounds/min.)

Lewis Machine Gun

As the production rate for the Vickers machine gun remained well behind expectations, other halfway-operational machine guns were sought which could fill the gap in the short term. The Birmingham Small Arms Company (BSA) had been producing the Lewis machine gun under license since 1913 and by autumn 1914 reached a weekly capacity of 150 weapons. That was sufficient for the weapon to be introduced into service. By March 1916 production reached 800 weapons per week and had risen to 1,000 per week by the end of the year. By then the original enthusiasm for the Lewis had waned somewhat. Compared to the Vickers machine gun the Lewis was regarded as inferior, difficult to control when being fired and only conditionally suitable for sustained fire. Its qualities were slow to emerge. The Lewis was comparatively light, it was easy to camouflage in the field and offered a small target, it was relatively accurate and in an emergency it could be operated by a single gunner. From the summer of 1916 the Lewis became the principle machine gun type of the infantry battalion, while Vickers machine guns were concentrated in the Machine Gun Corps. Each battalion had from 8 to 16 Lewis machine guns, a number which doubled by 1918. The Lewis was a gas-operated weapon with an open rotating bolt. The barrel was air-cooled by means of an aluminium case on which the cooling fins were arranged radially. Changing barrels was difficult, as the weapon had to be completely disassembled. The ammunition was fed from a pan magazine with a capacity of 47 rounds, which was attached on a central pin. As a captured machine gun, the Lewis Gun was very popular with the German troops and was even used as standard equipment by the two musket battalions. In 1917 the Germans even published their own manual for the Lewis Gun. The majority of captured weapons were modified to use German ammunition. Among the components modified were:

• the receiver
• the barrel
• the gas regulating screw
• the lock
• the two extractors
• the feed slot
• the sight
• the ammunition drum and the retaining washer for the screw

Lewis Machine Gun Specification

Manufacturer: Birmingham Small Arms Company (BSA)

Operating principle: Air-cooled gas-loader with open bolt

Caliber: Originally British .303 adapted to 8 mm x 57 IS (S cartridge)

Length: 1,283 mm

Weapon weight: 12.8 kg

Ammunition feed: Top-mounted pan magazine with 47 rounds

Rate of fire: 500-600 rounds per minute (theoretical) 

Use of Captured Machine Guns

The inventory of machine guns at the start of the war was adequate to equip all active, reserve and a majority of the mobilized Landwehr infantry regiments with machine gun companies or at least platoons. The material of the fortress machine gun formations and replacement units, in particular, was used for this. Contrary to the claims of the authors of the Reich Archive, the replacement of losses and the need for additional machine gun formations could not, however, be covered by new production alone. Contrary to claims made by the authors of the Reich Archive book Der Weltkrieg1914-1918, losses of equipment and the requirement for additional machine gun formations could not be covered by new production alone. The authors of the ninth volume of the series on the World War were forced to admit that “the formation of numerous additional machine gun formations to reinforce newly-created field formations and units and to round out many reserve and Landwehr formations which were inadequately equipped with this proven weapon, was only possible with help of the great booty [in MGs, the author]”. The units thus “procured” machine guns to make up for gaps and losses in their own equipment. In August 1915, the machine gun company of Landwehrregiment 77“fortified” itself with “the Canadian machine guns captured in front of Ypres”. The chronicler proudly reported that the company thus had ten machine guns instead of the authorized six. The military administration could not stand idly by and watch this proliferation of captured machine guns in its own ranks. In July 1915 the Prussian War Ministry issued the following secret order and distributed it widely to all command centres of the field army (more than 300 copies for corps and divisions), all rear-echelon inspectorates and the war ministries of Bavaria, Saxony and Württemberg:

“The captured Maxim system machine guns (all Russian, some English and Belgian) will be sent via the weapons collection points to a repair workshop for captured machine guns, where they will be modified to use German ammunition. It is therefore again pointed out that, in order to achieve a lasting strengthening of the army’s firepower by means of captured machine guns, it is of great importance that all captured machine guns which are not completely usable and all captured individual parts for these are to be sent back to the weapons collection points, so that the machine guns which can still be repaired can be sent back to the front as quickly as possible”.

Thus the primary concern was to centrally record the inventory of captured machine guns and then issue the weapons according to need. An inventory report by the 6. Armee dated March 1915 reveals the importance captured machine guns had achieved in the equipment of the frontline units.

Inventory Report on Machine Guns by the 6. Armee on March 29, 1915:

Unit     II Bav. XIX     6th Bav. Res.Div.       VII      XIV     I Bav. R.C.      IV        Total

AC      AC                                          AC      AC                              AC     

MG 08 54        78        24                                61        71        62                    51        404

Engl. MG

3                                                          4                      4                                  11

French MG

15                                                                    5          4                      2          26

Total    72        78        24                                65        76        70                    53        441

Nine percent of the frontline machine guns of Headquarters, 6. Armee were captured equipment. The British machine guns (Vickers) were placed on equal terms with the MG 08 “by putting in German barrels”. This was not possible with the French Puteaux and St. Étienne models. They were therefore regarded as “not fully adequate”³⁸. More favorable was the assessment of the Hotchkiss Model 1914 machine gun, whose barrel could be changed. Let us then follow the bureaucratic struggle for the possession and distribution of captured machine guns. Located in H.Q., 6th Army’s rear area were the “siege artillery workshops” in Douai. In line with the Prussian decree, on July 24, 1915 the Bavarian War Ministry directed the Bavarian AOK 6 “not to repair such machine guns, which can be modified for German ammunition [the British Vickers only, the author], yourself, rather send them via the rear-echelon inspectorate to the repair shops at the Rifle Examining Commission in Spandau”. Only the French machine guns, which because of their design could not be rebarreled, would continue to be repaired at Douai. As the directive from the Bavarian War Minister, General der Kavallerie von Kress, was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army, His Royal Highness Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, he wrote politely but firmly: “Furthermore it is suggested that machine guns repaired by the siege artillery workshops in Douai […], absolutely not be delivered to the units, but instead to the equipment supply service of the rear-echelon inspectorate and from there via the rear-echelon inspectorate to the troops by way of  approved supply channels. It is hoped that this procedure will, in future, eliminate the possibility of arbitrary increases in the strength of machine gun formations”. The response from the AOK 6 was pure insubordination: “The A.O.K. is unable to comply with the request expressed in K.M.E. 24.7.15 Nr. 65817b, that British machine guns, for only such can come into question here, be modified by the Rifle Examining Commission Spandau. It is in the interest of the units that such guns be made usable as quickly as possible by inserting German barrels. To date the siege artillery workshops in Douai have carried out this work quickly and completely satisfactorily. The suggestion in the final sentence of the above-named decree [sic!] has already been taken into account, so that an arbitrary augmentation of machine gun formations by taking German guns is no longer possible.” Now there was no talk of an arbitrary increase resulting from the addition of German machine guns, rather that a “possessor’s mindset” was spreading in each army area which complicated the central control of the supply system for captured MGs. Just one striking and documentable example was described here, but in 1916 the Prussian War Ministry found it necessary to again stress in the introductory remarks to the Beute-Maschinengewehre manual: “Referring to the stipulations in Clause 8 of the decree of 8/7/15 No. 2573.6.15 A2, it is underlined once again that no unit or senior headquarters is authorized to permanently retain newly-captured MGs without the authorization of the K.M. [War Ministry, the author]. All newly-captured MGs, including parts of such, are to be sent to the weapons collection centers in the homeland […], even if the MGs are still in usable condition and were used against the enemy immediately after capture”. At the end of 1915, of the 8,000 machine guns “in the field”, 1,900, or about 24%, were captured weapons. The fighting strength of the German infantry, which by 1915 already meant the firepower of its unit, was to a considerable degree dependent on captured machine guns. Prior to the introduction of the MG 08/15, German machine gun production failed to bridge this gap. The acquisition of captured machine guns, their repair and rebarreling (when possible) to take German ammunition and their central distribution thus became a strategic issue. The rear echelon inspectorates formed “collection companies”, which searched the battlefields for materiel left behind by the enemy. The German Army communiqué of March 4, 1916 proudly reported that “during the work of cleaning up the battlefields [near Donaumont, author’s note] … the booty” had risen “… to 161 machine guns.” These weapons were not only shown at “war displays” in the homeland, they were also immediately made usable by the frontline troops, as a summary of the machine gun equipment of the Bavarian Army from February 1916 confirms.

Inventory Report on Machine Guns by All Bavarian Units on February 1, 1916:

Unit                             Germ. MG 08 Russ. MG modified    English MG    French MG

1st Bav. Inf.Div.         32                    6

2nd Bav. Inf.Div.        35                                                                                3

II Bav. Army Corps    54                                                        10                    19

III Bav. Army Corps   74                    3                                                          27

I Bav. Reserve            78                    14                                4                      10

Corps

6th Bav. Reserve         24                    2                                  9                      10

Division

10th Bav. Inf.Div.       23                    11

11th Bav. Inf.Div.       44

XV Reserve Corps      99

Bav. Replacement Div.  16

6th Bav. Landwehr     51                    12                                                        11

Div.

Bav. Cavalry Div.       16                    39

Rear-Echelon              26                    2                                  1                      1

Inspectorate 6

572                  89                                24                    81

According to the tables of strength and equipment, an infantry division was entitled to 24 machine guns plus 4 reserve MGs in four machine gun companies. The army corps with the machine gun company of the light infantry battalion was supposed to have 54 MGs plus 9 reserve weapons. A cavalry division, whether it was assigned an MG-Abteilung or a light infantry battalion, had just 7 to 14 machine guns. The effective numbers show that the actual numbers with the units were sometimes twice that. With its 54 MGs, 39 of them captured weapons, the Bavarian Cavalry Division had just as many machine guns as an army corps. The number of machine guns in the I Bavarian Reserve Corps had doubled. The situation was similar in other units. Only the Bavarian Replacement Division was below its authorized strength. Of the 766 machine guns, 194 were captured weapons. This multitude of machine gun types not only represented a welcome reinforcement, but also a special challenge for the training organization. Training courses on captured machine guns were set up for personnel of the field divisions at training camps in the occupied areas at Beverloo and Tongern in the west and Rembertow near Warsaw in the east. The freshly-trained recruits from the homeland were first familiarized with the captured weapons at field recruit depots, of which each division had one. The battle-tested veterans of the field divisions were instructed in the use of captured MGs in training courses at training camps. Recruiters from the homeland, who often had absolutely no experience with machine guns, were familiarized with the captured weapons at field recruit depots.

The number of Russian machine guns that made their way to the Western Front is striking. While the directive that the “army high command weapons collection officers” were supposed to send all captured French and British machine guns to the weapons collection centers in Spandau was still valid, in the east the authorities were more generous. In view of the enormous number of captured Russian machine guns, the organized repair of Russian machine guns began in the 8th Army’s command area as early as the end of December 1914. As the Russian Maxim system was largely similar to the MG 08, this presented no great difficulties. To ease the spare parts situation and to use German ammunition, the German MG-Schloss 08 lock, a German barrel and the German sight were installed. The Russian recoil booster was retained. The work was carried out by the machine gun workshop in Kovno. Its director, one HauptmannSchutte, noted, not without pride, that “the idea of using German replacement parts […] came from the local office here in the east” and was then used in exemplary fashion for the “adaptation of new spare parts for all eligible machine guns in every German theater of war”. The General War Department thus trusted that there would be no arbitrary actions in the 8th Army’s area and that of the later command area “Ober Ost” like those taken by the 6th Army in the west. The rules were different in the west: only “permanently-assigned” captured machine guns were permitted to be repaired in the “machine gun repair workshops” of the individual army high commands. Spare parts for captured MGs were only to be ordered from the Rifle Examining Commission by way of the rear-echelon inspectorates. The already-mentioned Beute Maschinengewehre Manual provided the basis for this. The situation eased when the MG 08/15 began arriving from April 1917. Central management of the captured machine guns was no longer mandatory and the Rifle Testing Commission could be released from the task of providing spare parts for these weapons. Two captured machine gun workshops were set up in Warsaw and Brussels, one each for the east and west. The workshops took over the work on captured MGs previously done by the GPK, specifically: Captured Machine Gun Repair Shop West: repair of all machine guns captured on the Western Front and modification of same for Type S ammunition, provided this is envisaged. Further production of all spare parts required by the MGs and their procurement was done in conjunction with the Wumba. The Captured Machine Gun Repair Shop East took over the same tasks for all machine guns captured on the Eastern Front, including by the Army Groups Archduke Joseph, Mackensen and Scholz. The previously-cited Clause 30 of the decree of May 30, 1916 Nr. 1273/16 A2 geh. was amended insofar as captured machine guns, provided they were usable and ammunition was on hand, would remain at the disposal of the affected army high command. Otherwise they were to be sent to the responsible captured machine gun repair workshop. Once repaired, the machine guns were to be sent back to the affected army high command. The AOK was also given back autonomy in this field. The machine gun crisis was effectively addressed. Use of the Madsen machine gun was an exception in this complicated allocations battle between the military administration and the individual AOKs. The available stock of these captured Russian guns was not divided, instead from 1915 they were all used by two special formations. In doing so they selected a weapon of which the GPK thought nothing before the war and only a little after 1915. The muskets were used by units of the infantry, the cavalry and in small numbers by the air force, where they were soon replaced. In the infantry, Musket Battalion 1 with three companies and Musket Battalion 2 with two companies were formed effective August 18, 1915.

Despite heavy losses in the subsequent fierce fighting, the Rifle Examining Commission, which was responsible for the supply and maintenance of the muskets, succeeded in keeping the two battalions operational with their Madsen guns until December 1916. At that time the GPK’s efforts to modify the Lewis Gun for S-Type ammunition were completed successful. The GPK therefore proposed to the Prussian War Ministry that the two musket battalions be gradually reequipped with this very popular weapon. The 2nd Musket Battalion was first to reequip, transferring its muskets to the 1st Battalion. Instead of 30 Madsen machine guns in three platoons of ten guns each, the companies now received 18 Lewis Guns in three platoons, each with six weapons. Every three Lewis Guns formed a section led any an Unteroffizier. Each gun was served by one gunner and three (in position two) ammunition bearers. 24 magazine drums in 6 drum boxes were assigned to each gun. Each drum held 47 cartridges. In total a company had 108 drum boxes with 432 magazine drums and 20,304 cartridges kept at readiness. There was also the cartridge wagon with 20,160 rounds. Musket Battalion 1 also reequipped on the Lewis machine gun after the last Madsen machine guns were technically used up, on August 8, 1917.

On April 22, 1918 the War Ministry decreed that the two musket battalions be reorganized into two machine gun marksman Abteilungen attached to the M.G. Scharfschützen-Kommando West. “The designation Musket Battalion No. … and the uniform remain unchanged. The only difference is that the badges awarded the marksman Abteilungen by the All-Highest [the Kaiser] are to be worn”. The great machine gun crisis was resolved in the summer of 1916. The number of MG 08s was sufficient to assign a machine gun company with six guns to every battalion of every active, reserve, replacement, Landwehr and Landsturm infantry regiment. The independent Jäger and assault battalions even received two machine gun companies, organized into 3 platoons each with 2 machine guns. The decree envisioned that: “During reorganization, the Maxim MGs modified to use German Type S ammunition are to be considered equal to the German MG and used with them. They are also to be included in the figure of 18 for each infantry regiment (12 for each Jäger etc. battalion)”. Previously only the British Vickers Maxim type machine gun was considered equal. After conversion, Russian Maxims were also considered of equal value.

In the process, the MG 08 took over the role of “heavy” machine gun in the support role. That there were sufficient numbers of machine guns is confirmed by the strength reports of units like the 14th Bavarian Infantry Division. The authorized strength of 54 MGs was achieved and only a few wagons were missing. In March 1917 a state was reached that allowed “a decision as to the further use of the MG 08s becoming available from rising production” to be made. Now all field and heavy batteries could be equipped with one or two MG 08s for anti-aircraft defence and direct protection. The problem now was increasing and providing replacements for the complement of enlisted men. From 1917 the direct firepower of the infantry was based on the MG 08/15, of which each company initially received 3 and later 6 examples. As the number of domestically produced machine guns grew, the importance of the captured machine guns diminished by a similar degree.