Infantry Doctrine-6
When viewing the picture above, obviously the firing line in front was covering the firing line in the back, which was “jumping” forward. The infantry moved forward by running stretches of about 50 meters before taking cover again. This tactic is called sprungweises Vorgehen (jumping forward) in German today and called “bounding overwatch” in English. Another core change was to end the traditional doctrinal separation between the artillery and infantry battle. Both branches had to be coordinated and led together as combined arms. This coordination was difficult to achieve and caused a lot of headaches during the Kaisermanöver 1906 and 1907. What worked well was the drill towards employing the terrain for cover and using the spade to dig in even during attacks. In Löbell’s 1907 annual report, he maintained that infantry made a good and extensive use of the spade to create cover. He claimed that infantry units managed to keep “spade-work” (Spatenarbeit) in good balance with advancing during an attack.
Theoretically, the German manuals after 1900 used all the experience of contemporary wars and also kept pace with technical developments such as the introduction of magazine-fed repeating rifles and machine-guns, but many traditional officers tried to keep infantry tactics at the level of the Franco-Prussian war. Starting in the fall of 1906, the commanders of III and V Army Corps demonstrated the use of the new manual in their autumn maneuvers. However, the commander of VI Army Corps did just the opposite using massed infantry assaults and cavalry attacks without artillery support. In 1907, both VII and X Army Corps showed similar techniques. The Chief of the General Staff critiqued the 1911 maneuvers as having skirmish lines too tightly packed. By 1912, infantry was once again advancing shoulder to shoulder in maneuvers.
Not only in Germany, but also elsewhere, there was the deeply engrained notion that war had to look like a poster of advancing dense lines of infantry flying their flags to the sound of the bugles, interrupted only by light artillery fire and surprising cavalry assaults. After 1914, an entire generation paid the price for this outdated picture of war. For those who think that the old 1870 way of attacking was outdated, we only have to take a look at the order of XV Army Corps on 3 November 1914, “I direct therefore that the attacks are to be pressed home with bugle calls and with the regimental bands playing. Regimental musicians who play during assaults will be awarded Iron Crosses.” – v. Deimling.
The heavy sled-mounted German machinegun 08 developed at the government armory at Spandau was a water-cooled Maxim system. It could fire hundreds of rounds in a row (Reihenfeuer), not the short bursts of fire like modern machineguns do (called Feuerstoß in German). Chambered for the standard German service cartridge caliber 8mm (like the Gewehr 98), the ammunition was supplied in 250-round belts and fired at a rate of 500 rounds per minute. Later in the war, the light machinegun 08/15 was equipped with the lock model 1916 that allowed an increased rate of 600 rounds per minute. Machine-gun formations increased infantry firepower. Terrain cover that was much too small to accommodate an infantry platoon could easily accommodate an entire machinegun battalion. If mass fire delivered in volleys and at great distance were already an integral part of infantry marksmanship, this concept applied far more to machinegun formations. Since the guns were equipped with a four power optical scope, they could be far more precise at long distance compared to rifle fire. In general, either machinegun battalions or machine-gun companies were not broken up into platoons when used tactically. The tactical leader, usually the regimental commander, was supposed to utilize machine guns to define a center of gravity for his infantry fire. Ideally applied from a flanking position, these highly mobile machineguns could be used in offensive as well as in defensive missions.
If infantry attacks were still carried out in such dense lines, the devastating effect of Reihenfeuer can easily be imagined. While comparatively small machine-guns formations could provide huge firepower, the traditional doctrine still applied to infantry attacks. Even with the massive build-up in 1912 and 1913 and the mobilization of the Falkenhayn corps in autumn 1914, the focus was on a better employment of the available manpower than on better use of firepower that machineguns offered.