The Reverse Side of Auftragstaktik part 3.
On 4 September, the OHL issued a new directive by radio message to all armies in the west that implied an even more radical change in strategic direction. This directive clearly laid down that the First Army was to remain between the rivers Oise and Marne (i.e, north of the river Marne); the Marne bridges around Château Thierry were to be captured and held for future crossings. Second Army between the rivers Marne and Seine was to occupy the Marne bridges between Nogent and Méry sur Seine. HKK 2 remained with First Army but deployed one cavalry division to HKK 1. HKK 1 remained with Second Army and was to deploy one cavalry division to the Third Army.
At a glance, this directive ordered an extremely difficult move, aimed at diverting both First and Second Army from their advance across the Marne to form a shield against Paris instead. This would be a difficult and complex move, especially when the train and supply formations trailing behind the armies were taken into consideration. In addition, this directive was based on a completely different operational approach compared with the advance thus far. If ever the OHL under Moltke had followed any kind of Schlieffen plan or Schlieffen doctrine, its goals were abandoned from the moment of issue of this directive. In short, the directive amounted to a complete strategic turn around and put an end to the Blitzkrieg-style advance in the west. Moltke and the OHL had obviously realized that the initial goal of enveloping the entire French and British forces had failed; they realized that the French forces around Paris would impose a massive threat on the right flank of the advancing armies—particularly to the flank of the First Army. They had accepted the consequence and ordered two armies to face against Paris and the other armies to slowly and carefully continue their advance with a much more limited objectives. Finally, the OHL had admitted that the German opening moves in the west had bogged down; the initial operational attempt had failed, and that the German forces had to regroup for a second attempt.
In contrast to the OHL, the army commanders in the west, at least the army commanders of the First through the Fifth Armies, still thought they were on the final stage of the road to victory. The army commanders thought it would simply require a last huge effort to beat the already routed and weakened Allied forces. However, the latest directive implied such a radical change for the continuation of the operations that it had been necessary for the Chief of General Staff to explain in person his situational analysis, his reasons, and his intentions to the army commanders so that they would act according to his plan and his intentions. This meant that Moltke ought to have either called the army commanders to Luxembourg for a joint briefing or to have toured the army HQs to explain the changes to the army commanders individually. Instead Moltke sent General Staff officers to the army HQs to brief the directive. Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch was sent to First Army Headquarters. It is easy to imagine what a difference there would have been had Chief of General Staff personally explained his intentions. As it was, a messenger delivered the explanation. Although he had the prestige of the General Staff to underpin his presence, his rank dictated that Hentsch could only meet the Chief of General Staff, General-Major v. Kuhl; the Commander, Generaloberst v. Kluck made himself unavailable. The reception of the liaison officers by the other army commands was slightly better; at least they were able to deliver their message to the army commanders in person. Unfortunately, supplementary information that the OHL later sent in writing to the Army HQs sowed confusion instead of creating clarity.
Since the communication channels between the OHL and the army HQs were poor and time consuming, and because no intermediate command level such as an army group was available, there should have been no other choice for the Chief of General Staff than to convey such important changes in person. Morse telegraph and messengers were unequal to the task. If Moltke wanted to command in mission-type or Auftragstaktik style, he ought to have invested the necessary time and effort to lay his intentions out to the army commanders. Otherwise he could not expect them to understand and follow these intentions. Again it should be emphasized this is not a judgment or comment on the content of the decision made; the aim is simply to analyze how the decisions were made and how they were given to the army commanders and to pose the question—Was this action appropriate if following the Auftragstaktik doctrine?
The analysis of the 4 September shows a defining moment during which the operations of the right wing finally slipped out of control of the OHL. Two days later, the Allied offensive on the Marne revealed the dangerous and exposed situation of the German right wing. When the climax of the battles at Marne and Ourcq was reached on 8 September, the OHL had only fragmentary information about the situation and even these bits and pieces of information were delayed due to the poor communications. Had the army commanders been sufficiently briefed about Moltke’s intention on 4 September, they could have been expected to command their troops during this climax accordingly. But since the basic rules of Auftragstaktik had been already violated on 4 September, the situation spiraled increasingly out of control under the blows of the Allied attacks. The situation was exacerbated by the unresolved rivalry between Kluck and Bülow. Coming under immense pressure at the Ourcq, Kluck did not hesitate to open Bülow`s right flank to enemy attacks by throwing two army corps from Montmirail to the Ourcq. This attack created the 50 km wide gap between First and Second Army that the BEF was able to exploit in its operations against the German right wing.
to be continued……