The climax of the battle had been reached, but instead of taking control of the situation by driving to the army HQs, the Chief of Staff remained in his headquarters in Luxembourg.[1] The OHL again sent Hentsch as a messenger to the armies to coordinate further operations. Again Hentsch did not receive a clear written order to pass on, just an ambiguous verbal directive. Even today it is unclear whether or not Hentsch was authorized to order a retreat. So Hentsch became the scapegoat for the disaster at the Marne, “luckily” he also passed away later in the war and could not defend himself during the fierce debates during the 1920s.
Moltke’s counterpart, Joffre, reacted differently to a similar situation. The French grand quartier général (GQG) was quite a small organization built around a handful of field grade general staff officers just like the German OHL.[2] But one of the major differences was in the structure at the top. While in the German Army, the Kaiser was still the Supreme Commander and Moltke acted formally on his behalf, in the French Army the Chief of General Staff became Supreme Commander of the Army upon mobilization reporting to War Minister and President. Unlike Moltke, Joffre had a second in command: Général Henri Mathias Berthelot, the Chief of Staff of the GQG, who freed Joffre up to personally visit the army commands and the BEF.[3] On the French side, the commander of the Fifth Army, Général Lanrezac, was an equally aggressive and determined commander like Kluck. He was regarded as the best French army commander and, like Kluck, tended to develop his own interpretation of orders and directions issued by the Supreme Commander. Unlike Kluck, however, Lanrezac could appear personally rude and impolite in communication.
Lanrezac’s personality first came into focus on 17 August, when Field Marshal French, the Commander of the BEF, paid his inaugural visit to Général Lanrezac at his headquarters. French tried to create a relaxed atmosphere by starting with some casual conversation. In response, Lanrezac verbally attacked him for being late. French again tried to save the situation by asking Lanrezac in French for his opinion about the intended operations of the German Third Army, “What do you think the Germans are going to do at Huy [small fortress town at the bank of the river Meuse]?” Lanrezac turned to the interpreter and said, “Tell the [Field] Marshal, that in my opinion the Germans have merely gone to the Meuse to fish.”[4] From that moment on, French would never be willing to pardon this insulting behavior. From their first encounter, the working relationship between both commanders was poor. Some days later the BEF was engaged at Mons, and Lanrezac barely saved his army from envelopment by a retreat—the lost Battle of Namur. Lanrezac blamed the British for exposing his left flank to the German attacks.
A few days later, on 28 August, Joffre ordered the French Fifth Army to launch a counterattack at Guise and St Quentin against the advancing Second German Army under Bülow, who had already beaten him at Namur. Lanrezac felt himself threatened by far superior German forces moving against him—the Second Army in front of him, the First Army on his left flank, and the Third Army on his right flank. Because he believed that the British were already too far behind and would not be available to cover his left flank, Lanrezac refused to carry out this order. Joffre reacted very similarly to Moltke in comparable situations: he sent a messenger, Colonel Alexandre from the GQG, to Lanrezac to explain his intentions. Again Lanrezac clearly refused to follow this order.
On 29 August, Joffre personally drove to the headquarters of the Fifth French Army, accompanied by Major Maurice Gustave Gamelin (who would become Allied Supreme Commander 25 years later in the autumn of 1939) to drive his order home. The distance between the French GQG in Vitry le Francois and the Fifth Army headquarters was about 189 km—a little less than the distance between Luxembourg and the HQs of the German right wing armies. Joffre was determined to dismiss Lanrezac on the spot if he still refused to obey. The following Battle of St Quentin ended with another tactical defeat for the already beaten Fifth Army. But Joffre successfully interrupted the German advance and won time to assemble the French Sixth Army in the German flank. A couple of days later, right before the decisive offensive of the Marne, Joffre finally dismissed Lanrezac and replaced him by Franchet d’Esperey; Joffre had still not forgotten Lanrezac’s disobedience at St Quentin.
A comparison of the command styles of Moltke and Joffre reveals two entirely different patterns. While Moltke remained in his headquarters and restricted himself to issuing directives and sending messengers, Joffre took personal action when necessary and personally visited the army commands to bring order and insist on obedience. Joffre felt it more important to maintain his command authority than to retain in place intelligent, but insubordinate leaders. This comparison casts a harsh light on Auftragstaktik. Certainly this doctrine, (which could today be described as Management by Exceptions) required a strong—ideally charismatic—leader with a good deal of natural authority. After issuing his directive and explaining his intentions (ideally face-to-face with the army commanders), the leader had to be visible, had to ask for intermediate reports, had to encourage and motivate to follow his directions, and had to offer support if exceptional or unexpected situations jeopardized his goals. A commander, who remained in his headquarters without any personal contact with the army commanders between 2 August and 11 September, was running serious risks.
The second misapplication of Auftragstaktik occurred during the battles on the southern wing of the German Western Front. There were two different occasions, the first was when the Seventh Army was placed under the control of the Sixth, but tried to fight its own battles. The second instance involved the discussions between OHL and Sixth Army during the Battle in Lorraine. The first incident took place during the Battle of Mulhouse, the counterattack of the Seventh Army with XIV and XV Army Corps on 9 and 10 August 1914. In the same way that First Army was under the control of the Second Army, Heeringen was subordinated to the Bavarian Crown Prince, but he found this command relationship irksome. By counterattacking Mulhouse, he created a highly political issue. The German operations plan envisaged the loss of territory in the Reichslande in case of a French offensive. It could occur on the southern stretch of Alsace, because this area was considered less important, provided that the German forces could fall back on the upper Rhine and on the fortified Breusch line west of Straßburg. The Kaiser, however, opposed any loss of German territory, even if it were in the Reichslande. Aware of this, Heeringen acted against the plans of the Sixth Army, and he also opposed Moltke’s plans.
Moltke intended to draw the French Second Army deeper into Lorraine and to annihilate it in an envelopment carried out by the Sixth and Seventh Armies. When Heeringen asked for the endorsement of his counterattack from the OHL, he knew that Moltke could not turn him down without running into conflict with the Kaiser. Although Heeringen gained an initial success, it was at the cost of a delay of the German operations in the Reichslande. At the end of the Battle of Mulhouse, the XIV and XV Army Corps found themselves around Mulhouse. They were exhausted from the marches, combat, and losses; they had used up their artillery ammunition and needed to be transported back northward. Altogether the counterattack constituted a loss of three to four days for the commencement of the major operations in Lorraine. In view of the fact that the French offensive into Lorraine started on 14 August, this sidestep at Mulhouse could have caused severe problems at the joint between Sixth and Seventh Armies. Luckily, the Mulhouse operation did not lead to negative consequences, but it must have appeared to Moltke as if his operational objectives were already compromised.
Even worse for the further course of operations in the Reichslande were the ever-changing goals set by the OHL. Auftragstaktik required a clear goal and explanations of the intentions of the Supreme Commander. The first goal for the armies in the Reichslande was kept quite vague since Moltke was unclear about the French operations plan. So initial guidance amounted simply to a “wait and see” strategy. The Sixth Army’s Chief of General Staff, General-Major Krafft v. Dellmensingen, documented this strategy in his aide mémoire that had received Moltke’s endorsement.
After the slowing of the French offensive in Lorraine, dissent between OHL and the Sixth Army was fully exposed. The OHL wanted the Sixth Army to continue with delaying operations and to pull French forces deeper into Lorraine to be beaten by envelopment, the Sixth Army did not want to continue with the fighting retreat towards the river Saar. Dellmensingen and the Bavarian Crown Prince instead wished to take the battle to the advancing French forces in Lorraine with the help of the Seventh Army. Since he moved to Koblenz on 16-17 August, Moltke failed to visit the Sixth Army headquarters to explain his intentions personally. Instead, he sent Lieutenant Colonel v. Dommes to the Sixth Army headquarters to explain why Sixth Army was to carry out a fighting retreat and pull the French Second Army behind it. Only then, after the French Second Army exposed its flanks, were the Germans to attack. They would then launch an enveloping attack carried out by Sixth and Seventh Army in which the French could be either annihilated or beaten so seriously that the subsequent pursuit could be carried forward across the river Moselle. Once more this is not a discussion or evaluation of the operational decisions made. So it matters not whether Moltke’s idea of a battle of annihilation against the French Second Army and a subsequent counter offensive carried across the river Moselle and through the French fortress belt in pursuit of the French Second Army would have been successful or not. But certainly this option would have been worth discussing in detail among Moltke, Dellmensingen, and the Bavarian Crown Prince in a face-to-face meeting either in Koblenz or in St Avold.
Instead Lieutenant Colonel v. Dommes went to St Avold lacking a clear, written directive. He did not have any maps or further details with him. Dommes completed his mission as well as he could by explaining Moltke’s intention to the Bavarian Crown Prince and to Dellmensingen. But, the Crown Prince came to the conclusion that a further fighting retreat and delay would mean the risk of ending up with a “passive” defense deep in the Reichslande. It is probable that this “defense” referred to the Nied position that had been prepared for exactly that purpose. Together with his chief of staff, the Crown Prince came to the decision that an immediate decision against the already shaken French Second Army would offer a lower risk than further withdrawal.[5] So, on 17 August, the Sixth Army ordered Seventh Army to join the offensive in Lorraine that was planned to start on 19 August. Lieutenant Colonel v. Dommes had done his best but could not dissuade the Bavarian Crown Prince from a premature attack. Crown Prince Rupprecht, on the other hand, clearly acted within the limits of Auftragstaktik by deciding to do what he did. Without Moltke convincing him, or ordering him, to act differently, the operations had to take their course.
[1] On 9 September, the distance between the OHL in Luxembourg and the First Army headquarters in Mareuil was about 331 kilometers. Considering that Hentsch visited the Army HQs of Fifth to Second Army before, he certainly covered about 500-600 kilometers before he finally visited the First Army headquarters. This movement is quite a distance if one considers the poor conditions of the roads (which were congested by supply columns and trains) and the technical fragility of the cars.
[2] The French GQG had the following departments: – 1er Bureau (Personnel), – 2eme Bureau (Military intelligence), – 3eme Bureau (Operations), – Direction de l´Arrière (Supply and logistics), – Direction des chemins de fer (DCF) (Military railroad).
[3] The French Army had only two different generals ranks: général de brigade and général de division. All corps commanders and all army commanders were général de division.
[4] (Spears E., 2000), p. 75. In the renowned BBC TV series (in cooperation with the Imperial War Museum), “The Great War” from 1964, Lieutenant Edward Spears is interviewed in Episode 3 (“We must hack our way through.”), Part 4 (“War flows westward.”) personally describing this key scene.
[5] (Xylander, 1935), p. 80.