Artillery Doctrine-1
Compared with the review of infantry and cavalry tactics, the development of artillery doctrine was driven more by the development of new weapons and ammunition than tactics. Artillery was divided into the light horse-driven field artillery and the heavy foot artillery. There was always professional rivalry between the field artillery that endeavored to be more cavalry-like and the foot artillery that had been a stepchild of the technical branch. The battle of Sedan from the Franco-Prussian War provided the classic example of direct-fire artillery vanquishing the enemy.
The change from bronze barrels to cast steel barrels was made with the introduction of the C61[1] and the Krupp-made 8 cm C64 field guns. These improved guns permitted the use of greater breech pressures and heavier charges that increased ranges. Until the 1870-71 war, the infantry and artillery had developed evenly side by side. With the introduction of steel barrels and breech loaded artillery, the effective range of artillery increased, albeit slowly. The Dreyse rifle quadrupled the effective range of infantry fire from about 100-150 meters to 400-500 meters. The effective range of field artillery during the 1870-71 war was still little more than 2,000 meters. Given the longer rifle range, the field artillery had to expose itself to infantry fire more often than they traditionally had done. Fighting against French infantry with their Chassepot rifles meant exposing artillery crews to effective infantry volley fire at 800–900 meters.
Based upon the experience in the war against France, the Prussian artillery was organized into field and fortress artillery in 1872, establishing the artillery as an arm in its own right alongside the infantry and cavalry. Starting with the maneuvers of 1874, there was a major push to focus on the mobility of field artillery. Batteries were placed in open firing positions on slopes right in front of the infantry lines in order to start the artillery battle. The first phase of this artillery battle was the fight for fire superiority against opposing enemy artillery in direct counter-battery duels. After (hopefully) defeating the enemy artillery, the bulk of the German artillery could then begin the bombardment of the enemy infantry in order to weaken their lines. If this artillery fire was seen to have been effective against the enemy infantry, the emphasis shifted to the infantry battle, the attacking infantry exploiting the earlier work of the artillery. The concept of advancing to positions a mere 700 m in front of the enemy lines, unlimbering and firing became part of the glory of the attack. Field artillery batteries practiced taking up open firing positions and engaging over open sights. It was considered particularly brave, if a battery galloped into firing position and unlimbered its guns under enemy fire to support the infantry. Only foot artillery used indirect firing procedures against enemy fortifications and entrenchments.
Field artillery was a direct-fire weapon system. Ranges may have increased, but gunners still had to see the target to be effective. Artillery chauvinism became the focus of doctrinal discussions among the different branches, with the artillery trying to show that they deserved to be in the thick of the fight. Some traditionalists such as Albert v. Boguslawski and Wilhelm v. Scherff, refused to view artillery as anything other than an auxiliary branch. In July of 1881, however, the army corps commanders were directed by the Chief of the General Staff to permit a few batteries to expose themselves forward. The bulk of the artillery was to fire from ranges of at least 2000 m.
[1] While infantry guns are usually named with model and the respective year of official introduction, artillery pieces were named with a capital “C” for “Construction” (also spelled with “c” in Germany before 1901) and the last two figures of the respective year.