Mobilization-1914

State of War

Imperial Germany as a whole did not decide to go to war in 1914. A small group of officials appointed personally by the Kaiser made that decision. Nonetheless, the Great War has been cast as a people’s war, one in which the common citizen viewed as a defensive war. There were three distinct steps in the process that escalated to war.

1. The announcement of the imminent danger of war (Zustand drohender Kriegsgefahr).
2. The announcement of the State of Siege (Belagerungszustand).
3. The announcement of the State of War (Kriegszustand).

There was a declaration of “threatening state of imminent danger of war” on 31 July 1914. The Chief of Operations executed the most recent deployment plan. The telegraph section instructed 200,000 telegraph employees and 100,000 telephone operators at the post offices across Germany to send out news of the declaration to the 106 infantry brigades scattered throughout the empire. The railroad section requisitioned 30,000 locomotives, 65,000 passenger coaches, and 800,000 freight cars. The empty mobilization transports started moving immediately.

The first day of mobilization was 2 August. Upon mobilization, the entire German territory automatically became subject to a State of Siege. This meant that the army corps commanders took over much of the executive power of the civilian authorities. The State of Siege was authorized in Art. 68 of the Imperial Constitution:

Should the public safety of the federal territory be threatened, the Kaiser may declare any part of the same under martial law. Up to the publication of an imperial law regulating the occasions, the form of announcement, and the effects of such a declaration, the provisions of the Prussian law of 4 June 1851 (Gesetzes-Sammlung für 1851, p. 451), shall be valid in such case.

In fact, an imperial law was never enacted; therefore, the Prussian law of 1851 continued in force. The 1851 law did not specify in detail how this State of Siege was to be executed. This lack of specificity gave considerable leeway to the army corps commanders on how to implement it. Some commanders only introduced a dusk-to-dawn curfew and restrictive police regulations. Some included press censorship, prohibition of political assemblies, and control of the price of foodstuffs. Others used or abused this State of Siege to systematically act against socialist politicians, union leaders, and the press—even beyond the requirements of military censorship. The net effect was to make the military legally dominant over the rest of the government. This law was primarily used against the liberal elements on the left wing of the Reich. Interesting to note, one of the major demands of the mutiny in Kiel in 1918 that helped end the Great War was the elimination of this power.

The declaration of war against Russia came on 1 August. Prussian law regulated how the proclamation would be made, the suspension of certain rights, and any other effects of the State of War. When the Kaiser announced the proclamation of State of War, military courts were established, numerous fundamental rights were put in abeyance, most of the checks and balances upon government action were suspended, and there was a transfer of executive powers from the civil government to military authorities.

Upon mobilization, the army corps and their divisions and brigades were assembled and deployed forward. Back home, a wartime organization had to replace their roles, so each infantry brigade command was replaced by a stellvertretende Infanterie-Brigade, which is translated best as “being in place of.” The stellvertretende Brigadekommando took the role of the active brigade commands in regard to personnel replacements. In the same way, there were stellvertretendeGeneralkommandos in place in the active army corps, a stellvertretende Generalstab was created in Berlin after OHL departed for Koblenz. When Falkenhayn replaced Moltke the Younger after the Marne disaster, Moltke took the position of the Chef des stellvertretende Generalstabes—probably the biggest humiliation he had to endure.

The stellvertretende brigade and corps staffs were usually commanded by generals z.D. Officers on those staffs were mostly elder reserve or Landwehr officers, and they took over a very special role. Although the War Ministry issued orders during the war to achieve a uniform handling of the state of siege, the over-restrictive handling, particularly by the stellvertretende Generalkommandos II, VI and VII corps, led to political unrest and triggered several strikes later in the war.

The working-class Social Democratic Party (SPD) had never voted for military appropriations in the Reichstag, and, in fact, had always shown a policy of complete opposition to the military. In the last week of July 1914, the SPD staged massive antiwar demonstrations throughout the empire. Yet, on 4 August 1914, it voted in favor of military appropriations. This historic event led the Kaiser to say: “I no longer acknowledge any parties; I recognize only Germans.” The social classes and political parties allegedly came together and stopped fighting under a concept dating back to medieval times—Burgfrieden, an informal understanding of peace among rivals or political parties for the purpose of conducting a war. Burgfrieden originally represented peace within a fortress when it came under attack. Theoretically, it applied to all parties. Peace between the social classes of the population lay at the heart of the concept, but it had little practical application, as the classes did not mix.

The real difference provided by the Burgfrieden on this occasion was that the socialists united with other parties in the Reichstag to support the war. The Reichstag delegated its legislative powers to the Bundesrat. In other words, the democratically elected house delegated its authority to the appointed house of the nobility. Any emergency legislation under this agreement would be binding on all civil authorities. In theory, the Reichstag could still review all laws; however, of the 800 orders issued during the war, none were vetoed.

The decisive flaw in this procedure was that the Bundesrat responded to the Ministers of War of the four different contingents to oversee mobilization and production. Neither the Ministers of War nor the Bundesrat had control over the deputy commanding generals of the military corps districts. There was no civilian primacy within the military districts, unless the Kaiser willed it.